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| PHÎÒÎ: PHL |
On the eve of the visit of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton slated for July, official Kyiv made some rather peculiar gestures in its defense policy. If her visit does not promote U.S. assistance in the form of IMF loans, it is quite possible that such gestures will become even more unpredictable
On June 3, Ukraine revamped its multi-vector military doctrine that was in effect in 2003-2004. “I required that the government take drastic measures in its approach to budget policy concerning national security and defense using the experience of 2003-2004 and European practice as its basis,” President Viktor Yanukovych said in his state-of-the-nation address dedicated to his first 100 days of presidency.
President did not elaborate on which international practice he was referring to – the civil war in former Yugoslavia or other campaigns. The directive on reintroducing former priorities does not assess the majority of Ukrainian achievements in 2003-2004. In those years the conflict over the Tuzla Spit and U.S.-Ukrainian investigations into the supply of X-22 cruise missiles to Iran had flared up. There have been other no less exotic achievements of the notorious multi-vector policy, too.
The instructive part of this document in no uncertain terms states that the URRF (United Rapid Reaction Force, created by seven former Soviet states) should play the key role in the reshaping of defense priorities in Ukraine. This unit is made up of the most diverse combat-ready battalions and Special Operations Forces, tasked to neutralize the first attacks of a potential enemy.
Up until recently, the plans were to fortify the UFRR by including respective Ukrainian troops into EU Rapid Response Forces known as the Eurocorps.
The meeting of the NSDC held on June 1 also did not produce any prompt response to the question about the current task of the UFRR. Based on the results of the meeting, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Chief of the General Staff were replaced.
Col. Gen. Ivan Svyda appointed last year was replaced by Lt. Gen. Hryhoriy Pedchenko, who has worked as a deputy in the Odesa Oblast Council representing the Party of Regions since 2004.
At the same meeting, the National Security and Defense Council submitted the bill “On the Fundamental Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy” for review by the VR. Unlike similar documents from previous years, the new bill does not contain the clause on Ukraine’s plans of accession to NATO for the first time since 2003. The parliament sent the bill for revision thus provoking indignation of both the opposition and politicians in the pro-Russian camp.
Proponents of Yanukovych are showing even greater polarity. Defense Minister Mykhailo Yezhel outlined doctrinal changes on June 6 after his meeting with a group of foreign advisors accredited in his institution.
“The ministerial meeting of the Ukraine-NATO group scheduled for June 10 in Brussels will be very important for us. The Ukrainian government has declared it non-aligned status. At the same time, this does not mean that Ukraine is completely severing ties with the Alliance. We support the idea of moving this cooperation into a more practical realm,” Yezhel said.
After such an unexpected turn that proved the readiness of a non-aligned country to transfer its military cooperation into a “more practical realm”, the diplomats added even “more confusion”.
On June 8, Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Hryshchenko confirmed the plans of Ms. Clinton to pay a visit to Kyiv in July to start the work of an intergovernmental group within the framework of the full-fledged defense agreement known as the Charter on Strategic Partnership between Ukraine and the U.S. signed after the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008.
“Ukraine began creating foreign policy coalitions based on the recipe of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, despite the existing obstacles. A coalition with Russia does not mean there will not be a coalition with the U.S. and the EU. Furthermore, a coalition between the U.S. and the EU does not mean there will not be a coalition between China, Brazil and India,” a deputy defense minister of Ukraine commented on the news about the slated visit of the U.S. secretary of state to Russia.
In such a situation, defining who is a closer strategic partner and who is not so close is a complicated task. Apparently, due to difficulties in orientation the Presidential Administration immediately after the Security Council meeting initiated a review of the national defense doctrine. On June 4, the PA submitted its first defense bill to the VR proposing to amend the laws On Defense and On the Armed Forces. The document suggested expanding operational functions of the Intelligence Headquarters of the General Staff during peacetime in exchange for expanding the scientific tasks of this department, for example, determining and foreseeing external threats and evaluating the level of military security.
Up until recently, the majority of such tasks have been fulfilled by the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine (FISU). As to the nature and foreseeing the threats and evaluation of military security, they were studied by academic scientific institutions of the NSDC: the National Security Institute and the National Institute of International Security Affairs that President Viktor Yanukovych chose to shut down almost immediately after he took office.
The appointment of Lt. Gen. Petro Shatkivskiy to head the FISU is the next confirmation of the multi-vector policy. Prior to that, after building up a career in the SBU and the NSDC, Shatkivskiy served as a presidential representative for control over the SBU in Yushchenko’s and then Yanukovych’s administrations.
The majority of present-day top officials in the Law Enforcement Department under the Yanukovych administration, from Yezhel and Hryshchenko to Khoroshkivskiy and Shatkivskiy have significant experience in the “multi-vector rollovers” of the 2003-2004 Ukrainian policy.
Judging from such personnel policy, the new president’s appeal to returning to the past can be construed as a specific compliment to officials that decided not to wait for a more convenient moment and join the new president’s team in a rather complicated time, specifically, attracting foreign loans and stabilizing the work of the strikingly “technical” composite of the coalition government.
An even more complicated explanation operates on the mirror principle. Too many officials in the new government made their careers exactly during those blissful times. From this vantage point, the president could have distanced himself from the U-turns in the defense policy and play the role of a hostage of interests of the tensely united group of long-term associates.
There is another aspect in the latest multi-vector policy: unlike Leonid Kuchma, Viktor Yanukovych is quite weak when it comes to international affairs. It is also possible that this multi-vector policy is only a camouflage for a single-vector policy.
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