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Such an approach is dictated by the legacy inherited from the previous government. Clearly, Ukraine’s relations with the EU and the U.S. have slowed down to a standby as the Ukrainian leadership was in the throes of a systemic crisis in the dialogue with Russia
This forced President Viktor Yanukovych to assign this task as a priority to Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Hryshchenko and Assistant Chief of the Presidential Administration for Foreign Policy Andriy Honcharuk.
In a situation where the decision-making role of the NSDC regarding foreign policy was undermined by the liquidation of institutions under its auspices and lack of access of its secretary Raisa Bohatyrova to President. In such a situation the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidential Administration took decision-making on foreign affairs and security issues into its own hands.
The 30-minute meeting between President Viktor Yanukovych and U.S. President Barack Obama at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington was the main achievement in relations with the West. The two sides decided to establish the Strategic Partnership Commission, which is meant to enhance the level of Ukrainian-American dialogue.
Another important achievement of the meeting was the informal support of the U.S. of cooperation between Ukraine and the International Monetary Fund, which facilitated the allocation of the desperately needed loan to the government.
The agreement of the Ukrainian government to destroy 50 kg of enriched uranium at the disposal of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine was the price Yanukovych had to pay to set up a meeting at the top level. In essence, Ukraine sacrificed an asset that it could have used for scientific research of the nuclear cycle. In exchange for this, the president gained formal activation of bilateral relations, a chance to open a new line-of-credit with the IMF, a pleasant conversation in the White House and the status of a leader of the implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).
In relations with the EU, Yanukovych immediately called himself a “Euro-pragmatist”, as opposed to a “Euro-romantic”. Such rhetoric hit the right note for officials during Yanukovych’s first foreign visit to Brussels, where representatives of the European Commission made cautious statements on the possible assignment of a “road map” for a visa-free regime and accelerating the process of signing an agreement on a free trade zone.
In general, the EU showed restrained optimism towards Yanukovych’s European policy and was not excessively scrupulous in evaluating the progress in Ukraine. Nevertheless, in mid-May the EC published the so-called “neighborhood package” which included a report on the course of implementation of the European policy of neighboring with Ukraine for 2009 and the start of 2010. The document criticizes Ukrainian election legislation, the state of the judicial system and the dynamics of its reform and specified the inadmissibility of delaying the introduction of anti-corruption laws. The issue of freedom of speech in Ukraine elicited particular concern.
The accession of Viktor Yanukovych to the office of the president was accompanied by a statement of the neutral (non-aligned) status of Ukraine. Despite this, no institutional or regulatory reviews of relations with NATO were held in Kyiv. Contacts between Kyiv and NATO boil down to pragmatic meetings monitoring programs adopted in previous years.
NATO Secretary General for Defense Policy and Planning Irzhi Shedivi said Ukraine’s example is “unprecedented”. The country works within the framework of the Annual National Program of Euro-Atlantic Integration and is reforming its army and security sector with the help of NATO. At the same time, it declares its unwillingness to join the Alliance.
Domestic media describe the development of relations between Ukraine and Russia as either a “honeymoon” in Ukrainian-Russian relations or “selling out national interests”. Prolongation of the stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea until 2042 and the terms in the gas agreements, despite the dubious details, allowed to strike the security threats that Russia poses in Crimea off the agenda for the time being and give the country’s industry a break. The question is what results will such decisions bring down the road?
Signing the agreement on the procedures of the demarcation of the Ukrainian-Russian land border was a new page in the talks. Russia basically refused to discuss the demarcation of the land and maritime border in parcel and agreed to the Ukrainian variant: first the land, then the maritime border.
The solution of the problem of demarcation of Ukraine’s eastern border may inure to the benefit of the country’s aspirations of receiving a visa-free regime with the EU and simplify the signing of a comprehensive agreement on establishment of a free trade zone and association with the EU.
Arguably, the main achievements of the “honeymoon” became the statements on security in Europe and the Black Sea region that indicated the contours of the next stage of Ukraine’s foreign policy. The most important issues are security and formation of the basis of Yanukovych’s foreign-policy course and Ukraine’s non-aligned (neutral) status.
Apparently, official Kyiv is eager to sign a new document defining not only guarantees of Ukraine’s security, but also the mechanism of their realization. The matter is about the concretization of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, according to which the U.S. and Russia guaranteed Ukraine’s security when the latter gave up its nuclear arsenal.
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