 |
| PHÎÒÎ: PHL |
After the local elections many small and new parties, which are unlikely to surpass the number of mandates of the monsters of Ukrainian politics, will try to find a comfy place under the wing of a stronger player (provided the latter is in need of their services).
The voters, therefore, should not harbor illusions that their sympathy for any "third" force may radically change the political situation at the local level. Some of the new forces did not even hide their preparedness to cooperate with anyone (naturally, only on the basis of their programs) for the sake of staying in power. For those who are too shy to openly admit this, their “actions speak louder than words”.
In this regard, the most classic example is the long-term relationship of the Communist Party and its leader Petro Symonenko with the Party of Regions (not counting its light flirting with Yulia Tymoshenko’s bloc). It does not prevent them from lambasting the oligarchs imitating the “struggle of the classes”. Symonenko came up with a smart excuse to explain his affair with the PoR - by being in alliance with the “regionals” he plans to do away with the most reactionary detachment of Ukrainian bourgeoisie – the nationalists – and only then clamp down on his current allies.
Against which “reactionaries” the supporters of Symonenko team up with the PoR in local councils in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine (where there are no nationalists) is a rhetorical question. Given this, the electorate of the Communist Party does not even have to guess that their vote will go to the PoR. The only exception in this context is Crimea, where the CPU had a tiff with the PoR not as a “class enemy”, but a force that is actively trying to squeeze out the Communists. As a side note, the leader of the Crimean Communists Leonid Hrach, is not, to put it mildly, on friendly terms with Symonenko.
But then again, the left are not the only who are not above helping their natural enemies. The Ukrainian National Party, which teamed up with the PoR in the Kyiv Oblast Council. UNP leader Yuriy Kostenko, actually, is one foot in the coalition. But such vivid cases are rather exception to the rule, and not because the right are too scrupulous about its ideological chastity, unlike the left wing. It´s just that parties like Svoboda, the UNP, Rukh, the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (CUN) and For Ukraine! have virtually no chance of clashing with their ideological enemies – the PoR or the CPU – in the local councils of Western Ukraine. There the right-wing forces were simply forced to choose between Our Ukraine and BYT and preferences were usually given to the stronger of the two.
For example, in 2006 members of CUN in the Ternopil Oblast Council supported Tymoshenko’s team labeling Our Ukraine as the “proponents of a dubious liberal ideology”. Conversely, in Prykarpattia oblasts members of CUN took safe shelter under the wing of Our Ukraine.
The same story was with associates of the well-known proponent of a "non-alignment" policy Volodymyr Lytvyn, who had been in the arms of both Tymoshenko and Yanukovych. Accordingly, Lytvyn’s fellow party members in local councils had no choice but follow suit. Lytvyn once decided to correct his councilmen in the Cherkasy oblast by trying to persuade them that the PoR is “strangling” his brothers in arms.
However, the first deputy head of the regional council of Lytvyn’s Bloc and the coordinator of the new pro-governor majority Volodymyr Lukyanets did not hesitate to snap, “Pressure? What pressure? I´m normal. Take a look: I’m not deformed”. Moreover, Lukyanets advised Lytvyn to take pride instead in the fact that his deputies retained posts under the wing of the Regions. It seems that if the proponents of Lytvyn make it to any of the local councils (apparently, their number will be much lower than in 2006), they will pay little attention to their leader when choosing political partners.
Interestingly enough, if the collaboration of the old parties has taken notorious proportions, voters may get the illusion that the new parties will be more principled. These expectations have been essentially ruined by the deputy head of the Strong Ukraine Kostyantyn Bondarenko, who has sent a clear signal that his party would ally with whoever be the strongest.
“If the Strong Ukraine orders its representatives in the regions to bloc with a specific force rather than with the forces that truly set the tone, we will not achieve anything other than a mere presence in the councils. But we are running to councils to influence the situation, not just hold rallies. Of course, we may end up in the opposition against our will but this is not what we are looking for,” Bondarenko stated.
Indeed, it is unlikely that local SU sponsors, no matter in Lviv or Kharkiv, want to end up in the opposition. For this reason, there is no doubt that they will side with the “proponents of Tihipko’s reformist course, be it BYT or PoR, which will depend on the region. Apparently, the same logic would follow the local politicians of the Front of Change, Yedyniy Tsentr (United Center) and the leader of Vitaliy Klitschko’s Udar.
It is worth adding that regardless of which party they run for, the majoritarians will enjoy much more freedom in councils that will be formed based on a mixed party system and will lean towards the strongest center of influence. Again, politicians that will run on party lists can also breathe a sigh of relief as the new electoral law abolished scraped the imperative mandate rule. In light of this, the Ukrainian voter, just as will be the case with future presidential elections, is left without much choice.
Printable version
