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| PHÎÒÎ: I. CHERNYSH |
KW: The new Ukrainian government is seriously considering returning to a multi-vector policy. But don’t you think that these more than friendly relations with Moscow are evidence that there is only one vector left. Only, it is choosing Russia instead of the West?
A.V.: Ukraine is trying to maintain a balanced foreign policy. And we hope that Ukraine will pay equal attention to all three parts of this strategy. We have a commission on strategic partnership, which will meet this summer to identify a broad agenda from military to political, cultural and economic cooperation. I do not know whether the term “multi-vector” has any broader meaning, but we definitely see a desire to develop partnership with the U.S. and intend to do all we can to make this happen. As far as the CSTO, as I understand it, Ukraine is not looking for membership in any of the multilateral security organizations, at least at the moment.
Referring to neutrality today, I don’t really know. Neutrality is a term that is better understood during times of war. But we are members of an increasingly integrated community. Even the Swedes talk less about neutrality and more about partnership in achieving common goals.
KW: Analysts talk about the symptoms of formation of a Moscow-Berlin axis. Looks like Germany is not a strong member of the Alliance. Given this, how can NATO change its role in Europe?
A.V.: I guess I disagree with the fact that there are signs of formation of a Moscow-Berlin axis. German truly has good relations with Russia, but today we are developing even closer relations with Russia and other European allies are moving in this direction. Even after the recent tragedy (the death of the Polish delegation in a plane crash near Smolensk) Poland is building warm and friendly relations with Russia. I don’t think there is some separate process. Indeed, NATO itself is undergoing many changes. Since the end of the Cold War, it has developed into an alliance that is able to resist many of the new threats to global security. It took the task of establishing peace in the Balkans. We are working on a new strategic concept, which will be approved at the Lisbon Summit in November. It will continue its evolution and NATO will focus on new emerging threats in the 21st century, namely, the increasing role of extremist groups, WMD proliferation, cyber threats and energy security. Besides the traditional functions of defense of the territory of NATO, the alliance is dealing with many other threats that are constantly arising and growing. Other European countries like Ukraine, Russia, Sweden and Finland will soon face these new challenges as well. They are not members of NATO, but I think that cooperation with NATO could be very beneficial for them in coping with these challenges. NATO is developing cooperation with countries of the Middle East, the Mediterranean, North Africa, Australia, Japan and South Korea. In short, this is transforming into a kind of network of states that agree to mutual cooperation.
KW: Some experts argue that the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is more advantageous to Russia than the U.S. The status of the Russian nuclear arsenal is deteriorating and after ten years it will be reduced without any agreement. So, what’s the point in signing the treaty?
A.V.: We believe that this agreement is very balanced. It provides a significant reduction on both sides with an effective regime of inspections and I firmly believe it will allow us to enhance the stability of relations with Russia, reduce the risk of conflict and set a positive example for the rest of the world in terms of deterring the spread of nuclear weapons technology. The fact is that Russia still possesses thousands of nuclear warheads and it is in our common interests to reduce the level of nuclear confrontation, to avoid any kind of arms race and create a political foundation for cooperation in solving other problems. As I am not an expert in technical matters concerning the modernization of Russian strategic forces, I can not comment on this. But we still see a number of capable forces from the Russian side and it is in our common interest to establish effective control and reduce their number.
KW: Today there is much talk about a new architecture of European security. What do you think about this?
A.V.: It is now clear that some institutions created in the 1990s do not function as they should. We have witnessed a system failure in Georgia, when the country’s authorities were unable to prevent a conflict. Now we have received several proposals from Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, including a proposal to discuss a treaty on European security. We are not sure of the need for “big contracts”, as there are many agreements, including all the fundamental principles of European security. But we definitely believe that we must strengthen mechanisms for conflict prevention and their resolution in the event we are unable to preclude them, downsizing of armed forces and strengthening transparency in the defense sector.
KW: What is the role of Ukraine in this new system?
A.V.: This depends, first and foremost, on Ukraine itself. Until now, Ukraine has been an active participant in the OSCE. Of course, it participated in the negotiations on conventional arms control in Europe and cooperation with NATO. Thus, Ukraine is already participating in many international processes. We look forward to Ukraine’s participation in discussions about how to improve this system and how to solve specific problems.
KW: As a result of extension of the stationing of the Russian naval base in Crimea and gas contracts, Moscow will effectively regain control over Ukraine and in the longer term and its full presence in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Will this have an impact on U.S. strategy in the region?
A.V.: Let me point out that Ukraine is a sovereign state, which makes its own decisions. We continue to support Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, including the Crimea and Sevastopol. So, I do not see any change in our strategy.
KW: So in your opinion, there is nothing wrong with the fact that Russia is reviving its influence in the region and Eastern Europe?
A.V.: Moscow should voice its own agenda. We have stated many times that we do not accept the concept of “spheres of influence” or “sphere of privileged interests” in the modern world. Our goal is to break the line sections and work with the states interested in this. Thus, we intend to continue to developing partnership with Ukraine and hope that it will not be considered as a contradiction to Ukraine’s relations with Russia. This is not a zero sum game. This is our approach.
KW: Judging from how calmly the U.S. is reacting to Russia’s moves in the Caucasus, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, one can draw the conclusion that Washington is interested in the world become less multi-polar.
A.V.: We want all countries, whether they are in Central Asia, Europe or the Caucasus, to sovereign, independent and have the freedom of choice when it comes to policy in the sphere of security and security alliances. The threats we are faced with today essentially touch upon all countries. Outdated thinking in terms of spheres of influence is an obstacle, but we are working on overcoming this by building a European and global architecture of security. We understand that it is extremely difficult to settle these issues acting alone. Multi-polar, unipolar – these are rather analytical terms describing the modern world. We are trying in the spirit of American tradition to build systems of cooperation between countries. This is not always feasible as some countries like Venezuela are not interested in cooperation. Our approach, however, is perceived to be the best. This is precisely why we hope that Ukraine will continue to play a key role in the system of European security I described above.
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